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  This paper discusses trust and trust perceptions in infrastructure contracts. We 
focus on perceptions of the trustworthiness of the government purchasers of 
infrastructure services (a) by supplying companies and (b) by governments. In particular, 
we allow for trust misalignments which may give rise to ‘undertrusting’ and 
‘overtrusting’. The core of the paper sets out a game theoretic model of contracts which 
we use to explore the impact of trust misalignment both on economic efficiency and on 
investment levels, taking account both of asset specificity issues and maladaptation costs. 
We explore flexible contracts with and without pre-payments, rigid contracts (which do 
not allow for post-investment renegotiation) and hybrid contracts. Their efficiency is 
compared to an incentive compatible benchmark contract. The model is also used to shed 
light on current issues on the sustainability of private investment infrastructure contracts 

















Investment and maintenance in infrastructure industries raise well-known issues
of contract commitment, which are nowadays typically resolved by governments
establishing an independent regulatory agency1. However, that solution requires
both governments and supplying companies to trust that the regulator will act
fairly and impartially - and by no means all regulators do so, or at least are able
to do so. Underlying the regulatory debate are issues about the viability and
commitment to long-term contracts that involve governments, which again raise
major concerns about trust. In this paper, we investigate trust issues in the ￿-
nancing of infrastructure, the viability of contracts and the role of regulation.
More speci￿cally, we focus on how well aligned are trust perceptions between
buyers and sellers of infrastructure services, as well as on absolute levels of trust.
It turns out from our analysis, that the mutual alignment and evolution of trust
perceptions are both of major importance. Infrastructure assets are very long-
lived, sunk assets and the services that they provide are typically highly polit-
ically sensitive (electricity, water, transport, etc.). In consequence, the critical
issue for e⁄ective and sustained delivery is how to ensure adequate trust be-
tween the supplying entity and the government which is purchasing the output
and providing the legal underpinnings, including possible regulatory arrange-
ments. These issues are always important for private infrastructure investment
in general, but are particularly important, ￿rstly, for riskier investments; and,
secondly, for infrastructure investment in di¢ cult institutional environments as
are frequently found in developing and transition countries.
In practice,we typically observe two main approaches to private investment
infrastructure: (i) concession contracts and (ii) regulation by agency. The eco-
nomic literature focuses on these two ￿and, on the whole, treats them separately.
In particular, the literature on PPPs (public-private partnerships) in the UK,
the EU and elsewhere focuses on a concession contract approach. However, the
distinction between the two is often far from clear-cut since, ￿rstly, concession
contracts and PPPs almost always include sizeable amounts of ￿regulatory con-
tent￿ material in the contract; and, secondly, regulatory authorities monitor
and enforce contracts, including concession contracts.
A wide range of institutional arrangements is observed in practice to sup-
port private investment in infrastructure. This range includes, at one extreme
licensed suppliers operating on in￿nite length contracts supervised by a regula-
tor (classic electricity, water and telecom regulation) through to, at the other
end of the spectrum, ￿xed length concession contracts with no external su-
pervisory body other than the courts (e.g. many toll road contracts). There
are also many hybrid models which combine contracts with regulatory or other
forms of external regulation/arbitration etc. in various ways (e.g. UK railways,
the London Underground and many others). As argued elsewhere, contracts
and regulation are better regarded as complements rather than substitutes2. It
1See, for instance, Levine, Stern and Trillas (2005).
2See Stern (2003), Bolt (2003 and 2007). These both discuss the issues arising from the
perspective of a regulated industry. Athias and Saussier (2006) discuss these issues arising
2is worth pointing out that infrastructure contracts ￿like long-term contracts
between companies - can be found with various degrees of external contract
resolution and with varying degrees of renegotiating ￿ exibility both in terms of
tari⁄ and similar changes and for post-investment renegotiation3.
In this paper, we present and report the results of a game theoretic model
which includes not just the choice or contract versus external regulation and
the relevant institutional framework, but also the potential for renegotiation
(including regulatory review). Hence, following Menard and Saussier (2002),
we consider the relative merits of di⁄erent types of contractual arrangements.
In addition, we explicitly consider the role of term revision and renegotiation
clauses, following the evidence of Athias and Saussier (2006) on the way that
they are used (and not used) in toll road concession contracts. But, we integrate
the discussion of contracts with that of regulation on the basis that external reg-
ulators can allow simpler contracts, easier dispute resolution and, in particular,
more readily agreed contract renegotiation. This perspective arises from La⁄ont
(2005), Guasch and Straub (2006) as well as Stern (2003).
We adopt a game theoretic approach to these issues starting from a consid-
eration of alternative types of contract. We ￿rst develop a typology of contracts
building on Athias and Saussier (2006) who distinguished between:
(a) Flexible contracts (which explicitly allow for contract renegotiations after
investments have been made); and
(b) Rigid contracts (which set ￿xed contract terms before the investments
are made and do not allow for subsequent term changes or renegotiation.
We then develop hybrid models which are constructed by introducing a vari-
able for the probability of renegotiating a ￿xed contract after the investment has
taken place. This variable depends on the quality of the institutional arrange-
ments in the country. Following Athias and Saussier, this a proxy for the in-
stitutional and regulatory conditions that prevail in the environment where the
contract is to be implemented. Hence, it is a variable that covers the aspects of
country governance that most directly impact on the likelihood that the contract
will be fairly administered and any contract disputes resolved in an impartial
manner. This most obviously concerns issues to do with the rule of law, the
reliability and timeliness of law courts, and levels of probity (and corruption)
in public life4.
The measure of trustworthiness on which we focus is the probability that the
contract between the buyer and the seller can be enforced. We explore a range of
from the perspective of concession contract design.
3See Athias and Saussier (2006) for evidence on this for toll road concessions and Menard
and Saussier (2002) for water supply arrangements.
4Specialist regulatory or similar external agencies may be given some of the responsibilities
for these issues, but within a legal framework under which appeals and possibly implementa-
tion would be done by the local courts. Of course, countries may decide to establish indepen-
dent regulatory or similar agencies as a way of signalling to investors their commitment to
fair dealing on infrastructure contracts and investment. Such policy signalling devices were
advocated by the World Bank and others in the 1990s but actually go back to medieval times
for trade courts, as shown in Greif (2006).
3contractual and institutional arrangements that can reduce this perception gap
and/or help guarantee payment. These may take a variety of forms from (a)
insurance type of arrangements (for example World Bank guarantees against
regulatory risk) to (b) some form of explicit pre-payment contracts (see, for
instance, Braynov and Sandholm (2002). Essentially in our model, the term
￿ prepayment￿is interpreted broadly and can mean any facility that provides an
almost ￿as good as in your pocket money￿to the buyer and/or the seller.
The paper sets out the formal modeling relationship between trust percep-
tions and di⁄erent contractual arrangements, including ￿ prepayments￿ . A bar-
gaining model between the buyer and the seller is developed using a framework
based on Nash bargaining. We compare the welfare implications of each of these
models with those from an incentive-compatible benchmark contract and use the
welfare comparisons to evaluate the appropriateness in di⁄erent circumstances
of di⁄erent contract forms, or external regulator and pre-payment/guarantee
arrangements.
Note that in this paper, the term ￿ regulator￿is applied to any external agency
that can investigate contract violations, impose sanctions as well as adjudicate
disputes. A critical issue is whether or not the agency has the power to devise
and, even more, to impose contract modi￿cations. The e¢ ciency and reliability
of such an external body is an important determinant of the actual ￿and per-
ceived - value of the trustworthiness of the buyer. However, the establishment of
external regulatory agencies inevitably raises the issue of regulatory risk so that
it is not the case that having an external regulatory agency in place necessarily
increases trustworthiness of the buyer government.
In section 2 we address the question of whether concession contracts are
substitutes or complements. This is followed by section 3 where the framework
for our model is set out. We attempt to tackle the problem of misalignment
of trust perceptions regarding the buyer by using alternative forms of ￿ exible
contracts, followed by an analysis of rigid contracts. Then the welfare implica-
tions of rigid contracts with no commitment not to renegotiate are compared to
those of ￿ exible contracts. In section 4 the issue of trust and trust perceptions
is discussed in more depth in the light of the results derived from the model in
section 3. Finally, we draw our conclusions in section 5.
2 CONCESSION CONTRACTS AND REGU-
LATION: SUBSTITUTES OR COMPLEMENTS?
From around the mid-1980s, there was a strong push towards developing regu-
latory agencies as the key way in which trust could be established for countries
privatising their utilities or wishing to expand private investment. This policy
was heavily in￿ uenced by developments in the 1980s in the UK and in Chile
as well as some other countries. Indeed, World Bank policy advice suggested
that for developing countries, establishing an independent regulator would sig-
nal that they were trustworthy for supporting private investment (including
4allowing a reasonable rate of return). Hence, it was suggested that establishing
such agencies was a way of assuring infrastructure investors that countries were
now trustworthy i.e. eliminating the ￿ undertrusting￿problem.
Proponents of this view failed to give su¢ cient weight to:
(i) the degree to which governments would intervene into regulatory deci-
sions;
(ii) the degree to which regulatory laws and institutions provided discre-
tionary powers (which enabled governments to intervene arbitrarily); and
(iii) the time it takes to establish regulators and the volume of specialist
resources required.
In consequence, by the late 1990s, the optimistic view of regulators was seri-
ously battered by major regulatory failures, in particular after the Asian ￿nan-
cial crisis in 1997-98 when new regulators were e⁄ectively discarded and many
investments (or at least debt contracts for the investments) became unviable.
Spiller (2004) argues that concession contracts provide individualized regu-
lation with contracts that are rigid by origin rather than ￿ relational￿as typically
found in long-term contracts between private sector entities.
The problem with this argument is that, as is now well-known, tight contracts
are very brittle in the face of shocks and renegotiation can be di¢ cult. Renego-
tiation rates are typically very high for developing country concession contracts
- particularly for toll road and water concessions which Guasch (2004) report
at (respectively) 55% and 74% for Latin America over the period 1989-2000.
Of course, far from all renegotiations lead to project collapse. Nevertheless,
according to the World Bank PPI database, over the period 1990-2004, 160 in-
frastructure projects accounting for 9% of investment ￿ ows were canceled or in
distress. For water, 7% of projects accounting for 37% of investment ￿ ows in
the sector were canceled or became distressed, i.e. a disproportionate number
of high value concession projects.
The counter-argument to the case for rigid contracts in Stern (2005) is that,
where country governance is su¢ ciently supportive, trust is better achieved for
infrastructure investment by establishing a separate regulatory entity, which
has been assigned legal powers to act of its own volition. This agency has
the authority, in consultation with regulated companies and their consumers,
to modify existing regulatory obligations (for example, tari⁄s and quality of
service) and to establish new regulatory rights and obligations. In particular,
it has the right to review and revise regulatory obligations according to some
de￿ned process. Hence, it operates as a full regulator, including a degree of
bounded and accountable discretion.
Such a mechanism provides a way in which contracts can be reappraised
and revised in the light of changing circumstances according to a pre-agreed
and impartial process. Hence it allows simpler and more transparent initial
contracts and better enforcement. Of course, although regulators may behave
in the way recommended, there is no guarantee that they will actually do so.
Hence, the search for other mechanisms to help establish regulatory capacity
and reputation like initial regulatory risk guarantees, etc. to help underpin
5agreements and induce more trust earlier i.e. what we have described as ￿ pre-
payment￿agreements.
While contracts without external regulatory support may work well in some
circumstances, in many cases, the contracts will at best require major rene-
gotiation and in many cases will fail. However, there are also cases where
contracts with little or no regulatory support may well be su¢ cient. The di⁄er-
ence depends ￿rstly on the nature of the contracted service and its associated
investment (e.g. whether it is a straightforward and/or previously successfully
delivered investment); and, secondly, on the degree of trust between the pur-
chaser and the seller. The latter again raises issues as to whether the parties
do or do not have a previous history of successfully managing such contracts.
We will discuss this further in Section 4 in the light of the results from our
bargaining model.
In the model, we consider long-term concession contracts, contract rene-
gotiations and external "regulatory" arrangements as alternative potential in-
stitutional choices. They represent alternative ways not just of creating trust
between supplying infrastructure companies and governments; but also as alter-
native ways of aligning perceptions of trust ￿or at least providing protection
against major di⁄erences in perception. Some will be more appropriate in some
circumstances; others in di⁄erent ones ￿as with the choice between PPPs, di-
rect management and concessions in French water supply. Not only do both
buyers and sellers have a spectrum of quality on their past trustworthiness; but,
in addition, there are major uncertainties over future performance.
In this context, we introduce the concepts of ￿ undertrusting￿and ￿ overtrust-
ing￿ . These can be understood as follows:
Consider the typical case where the government is the buyer of infrastructure
services via some type of long duration contract or equivalent5 and the seller
is a private company, typically an infrastructure company. We de￿ne "under-
trusting" as the existence of a gap between the subjective estimates of the
trustworthiness of the buyer as perceived by the seller and as perceived by the
buyer himself i.e. where the seller believes that the probability of full payment
under the contract by the buyer is less than the buyer believes it to be. Similarly,
we de￿ne "overtrusting" as the case where the subjective estimate of the seller
that they will receive full payment under the contract is higher than the seller
believes it to be.
With undertrusting, the key problem is how to motivate and sustain ongoing
and agreed levels of investment in the face of unforeseen developments and
incomplete contracts. Conversely with overtrusting, the key problem is whether
or not companies, having made particular investments, will receive payments
that they think they are owed under the contract when unanticipated changes
are needed and/or unforeseen developments occur. Hence, one would expect
contracts with undertrusting to break down relatively slowly but contracts with
overtrusting to collapse rapidly.
5A ￿xed period UK-style infrastructure regulatory licence and an in￿nite US utility autho-
risation would both be included in this categorisation.
6Trust alignment occurs when the subjective perceptions of seller and buyer
are the same. Of course, this may be at a high level of trust (as in countries in
the top 5% of country governance scores) or at a very low level of trust (as in
countries with very low country governance scores). In what follows, we show
that, while the best outcome ￿particularly for consumers ￿involves contracts
at high levels of mutual trust; infrastructure contracts involving quite large
amounts of privately ￿nanced investment may be sustainable in circumstances
of low trust (e.g. Paraguay in the 1960s and ￿ 70s, some central African states).
Note that this paper is primarily concerned with welfare comparisons aris-
ing from objective and perceived trust variations of the buyer government. In
consequence, we consider neither (a) government perceptions of the trustwor-
thiness of sellers; nor (b) welfare issues arising because buyer governments may
not be maximizing consumers￿welfare (either because of a corruption tax or
because of agreeing protected monopoly provision which jointly increases buyer
and seller incomes). Including the second of these e⁄ects into the model should
be relatively straightforward. We leave these for subsequent work.
Similar trust and trust perception issues exist over the commitment of the
seller (i.e. the infrastructure company). We do not explicitly discuss such issues
in what follows but the analysis should be similar, albeit this time referring to
the probability of investment rather than the probability of full payment. We
leave this for future research - as well as combining buyer and seller trust and
trust perception issues. The combination could lead to a highly complex model.
3 THE MODEL
In this Section we set out our formal model of infrastructure contracting, trust
and trust perceptions.
The model draws on game-theoretic bargaining models that have been de-
veloped in related contexts. In particular, we draw attention to McMillan and
Waxman (2007) which explores the importance of trust in terms of the way it
in￿ uences the bargaining power of governments and multi-national companies.
We also draw attention to the paper by Braynov and Sandholm (2002) which
has a technical discussion of how trust can be integrated and dealt within dif-
ferent types of Nash bargaining solution modelling environments. The general
issue of government and company reputation in infrastructure concession con-
tracts is discussed in Guasch and Straub (2006) paper on concession contract
renegotiation.
For the infrastructure contracts that we discuss, within the context of con-
tractual arrangements, agreed payments to the seller are primarily a⁄ected by:
￿ the degree of asset speci￿city
￿ the trust perceptions that each party has of the buyer government
￿ the cost of renegotiating ￿ exible contracts
7￿ the size of maladaptation costs caused by the inability of the investor to
fully predict the investment outcomes in a rigid contract.
Following Athias and Saussier (2006), the last one is caused by the inability
of the investor in a rigid contract to reliably predict investment outcomes (both
investment costs and revenues arising). Major forecasting errors and/or major
shocks cause signi￿cant maladaptation costs, which can be positive (e.g. where
demand is much higher than predicted for a toll road) as well as negative (e.g.
in substantive investment cost overruns or unexpectedly low demand).
We have explicitly integrated into the model the issue of the reliability of the
purchasing government by inserting two trustworthiness parameters, a and b.
The ￿rst parameter, a, denotes the selling ￿rm￿ s estimate of the trustworthiness
of the buying government; while the second parameter, b, denotes how the buyer
government estimates its own trustworthiness. The buyer will pay the ￿rm with
some probability ￿ that measures its actual trustworthiness. It is also the case
that 0 ￿ a;b;￿ ￿ 1. In formal terms we postulate that a and b are the ￿rm￿ s
and the purchasing government￿ s estimates of ￿ respectively6.
The explanation of why a might be less than 1 ￿and sometimes considerably
less - is relatively straightforward. Governments have di⁄erent histories and rep-
utations over whether they have good or bad records at sustaining long duration
infrastructure and similar contracts as well as for prompt/delayed payment, etc.
However, the explanation of why b might be less than 1 is less obvious. One
example is where governments know that they have foreign indebtedness and
foreign exchange problems which mean that they may not be able to pay out or
may even need to suspend such contracts. However, this is likely to be more of
a crisis situation than a chronic, underlying issue.
A country where b is markedly less than 1 is most likely to arise in circum-
stances where governments have entered into arrangements with private (partic-
ularly foreign) investors but without total commitment. For instance, they may
have done so because of insu¢ cient tax revenue to fund preferred public sector
options, as a result of political and economic pressure from a higher level of gov-
ernment or as a condition for international lending or aid assistance. Another
case is where there is a clear possibility that a change of regime/government
would probably lead to a major renegotiation or suspension of the contract
(viz. Venezuela pre and post the Chavez presidency and the Chad government￿ s
actions to suspend the Future Generations Fund to collect earmarked savings
from oil sales). A further possibility is where political opposition to private in-
vestment in infrastructure increases over time so that the political costs to the
government of maintaining the private investment contracts gradually increase
so that they have an incentive to reduce payment commitments.
Of course, the key point of our paper is that a and b may not only be
signi￿cantly less than one, but also may di⁄er signi￿cantly from one another
i.e. a signi￿cantly greater or less than b ￿and this may be at higher or lower
absolute values of a and b. As the implications of this play a major role in the
formal modeling, it is useful to provide a little intuition at this stage.
6This is in line with the discussion found in Braynov and Sandholm.
8Consider an electricity generating company that wishes to build a green￿eld
plant to sell electricity in a developing country that has a mixed past reputation
on the degree of - but for which there is some evidence that it is committed to
- infrastructure contract observance. Let us also assume that the company in
question has not previously invested in the country. In that case, the 20-25
year power purchase agreement is likely to be negotiated where a is relatively
low ￿ and markedly lower than b. But, there will be signi￿cant con￿dence
limits around each party￿ s estimate. The contract will only be concluded if
the range of the con￿dence interval estimates of a and b overlap su¢ ciently; if
not, no contract will be concluded. Experience under the contract will reduce
the uncertainty ￿either the contract will go well and further contracts can be
negotiated with a converging on b or the contract will go badly and a and b will
diverge. In the latter case, there will clearly be no repeat contract and the ￿rst
contract may well not be sustainable.
The impact of any external regulatory entity will be, ￿rstly, on whether and
how far it helps (or hinders) in achieving a successful negotiation of a sustainable
original contract; and, secondly on whether and how far it helps (or hinders)
the resolution of problems that arise over the life of the contract.
Returning to ￿, we suggest that this be considered as the probability of the
enforcement of the contract by the country as indicated, for instance, by past
history as well as by the reliability of contract enforcement through the local
courts, or by the degree of international indebtness of the country concerned.
Alternatively it can be considered as an indicator of the probability that contract
violations will be detected and punished, as well as whether or not there are
e⁄ective adjudicating procedures for disputes. These latter concerns are likely
to be determined by whether or not there is some type of external regulatory
agency in place, including agencies whose role is to monitor and enforce such
contracts, or an external body arbitration agency/facility. The e¢ ciency of such
a body will determine the actual value of trustworthiness, ￿.7
Alternatively, we may adopt a stochastic approach where we set ￿ = b = x;
where x, the probability of enforcement (payment) by the government, is a ran-
dom variable following the uniform distribution over [0;1]: Assuming that f(x)
and F(x) are the density and cumulative distribution functions respectively,
we consider as F(a) and 1 ￿ F(a) the probability of overtrusting and under-
trusting respectively. Under this formulation, b is an objective measure whose
actual value is realised at some point in time; it is not a subjective perception
as elsewhere in this paper.
Our paper considers ￿ exible contracts, rigid contracts and hybrid contracts.
We denote the ￿ exibility of the contract by ￿. We de￿ne fully ￿ exible contracts
(i.e. contracts where a post-investment change in contract terms and/or a rene-
gotiation is certain) as those where ￿ = 0. For fully rigid contracts (i.e. those
where post-investment changes in contract terms and/or renegotiations are fully
excluded), ￿ = 1. We also consider hybrid contracts, i.e. those where there is
some positive expectation of post-investment changes in contract terms and/or
7We thank Chris Walters from the OFT for suggesting to us this alternative speci￿cation.
9renegotiations. For such contracts, 0 < ￿ < 1, with a greater degree of rigidity
as ￿ ! 1.
In what follows, we ￿rst consider three types of fully ￿ exible contracts. We
then look at rigid contracts and ￿nally, at the hybrid contract, where there
is a positive probability of ex post renegotiation. The three types of ￿ exible
contracts that we consider are:
1. The Athias and Saussier ￿ exible contract model, but including our trust-
worthiness parameters a and b.
2. The same model with a guaranteed pre-payment mechanism.
3. A benchmark, incentive compatible "F-contract" model with prepayments.
We show that the third model sets such prepayment terms, that the total
surplus split between the infrastructure company and the government is identical
to the one found in A&S where trustworthiness terms were not included in the
model. We conclude by comparing the e¢ ciency of the hybrid model to the ￿rst
￿ exible contract model.
Note that prepayments, as incorporated in models (2) and (3) above play
an important role in the analysis. They can take the form of an NPV contract
or similar (as in the endogenous contract duration for the Dartford bridge).
These pre-payment arrangements can be exogenous (as in the 2006 Athias and
Saussier paper, henceforth referred to as A&S) or they can form part of the Nash
bargaining process taking the form of a guaranteed payments (viz. prepayments
in the Braynov and Sandholm paper). We shall comment in more detail on
prepayment contracts in section 3.2.
We now turn to the formal analysis where, in each of the subsequent discus-
sions we analyse the bargaining model that corresponds to each of the above
models.
3.1 Flexible contracts
Let us start with the ￿ exible contracts as discussed in A&S, where we also in-
clude in the payo⁄functions the parameters a and b which respectively represent
the trustworthiness of the buyer (government) as estimated (i) by the seller (the
supplying ￿rm) and (ii) by the buyer (government).
As mentioned, the fact that the buyer estimates its own trustworthiness is
either a re￿ ection of the fact that its ability to pay is a⁄ected by circumstances
outside its control, or is a function of other institutional and/or political issues.
Of course such circumstances are also observed by the seller, but the two agents,
as discussed above, may well have di⁄erent estimates of the trustworthiness of
the person on the paying side.
The ￿rm￿ s pro￿t function and the consumer surplus8 are given by the fol-
8Here we assume that the government fully represents the interests of the consumers. If
this full alignment hypothesis is dropped, then this can be easily re￿ected by the model by
assigning appropriate weights to the consumer and producer surplus within the government￿ s
objective function.
10lowing functions respectively:
￿f = P0 ￿ C0 + at ￿ i
CSf = B0 ￿ P0 + fR(i) ￿ bt
where B0 and C0 are positive constants representing, ￿rstly, the social ben-
e￿ts and, secondly, the costs of providing the basic service without any invest-
ment. t denotes the amount of payment going to the ￿rm following renegotia-
tion between the company and the government on how the ex post surplus R(i)
(R0 > 0;R00 < 0;R000 < 0) created by the investment i undertaken by the ￿rm
will be shared between the two parties. f and ￿ are inverse measures of the cost
of renegotiation and of the degree of asset speci￿city respectively. If ￿ = 0 then
the investment is wholly sunk and hence has no opportunity cost. Therefore,
r(i) = ￿R(i) is the proportion of the surplus R(i) which is not sunk and hence
has an opportunity cost. For infrastructure contracts r(i) is likely to have a low
value.
The Nash Bargaining solution will be used in the ￿ exible framework to de-
termine the payment going to the ￿rm
(fR(i) ￿ bt)(at ￿ r(i))
The ￿rst parenthesis shows the net gain of the investment to the buyer, while
the second parenthesis shows the yield to the seller after subtracting from the
expected payment the opportunity cost of its investment (assuming that the











The equation above suggests that the lower a and b are, the higher is t, the
value of the payment to the ￿rm.
Conclusion 1 Better trustworthiness of the government buyer as perceived by
both the seller as well as the government itself will lead to a lower t paid, and
hence a better deal for the country in terms of its share of the revenue from the
project.
This result is con￿rmed econometrically in a recent paper by McMillan and
Waxman (2007), where their evidence indicates that higher quality of institu-
tions will lead to a larger share of the revenues from the investment accruing
to the country. In a sense an increase in a and/or b corresponds to a reduction
in the political risk premium and the cost of capital for a ￿rm to accept a long
duration contract with the government of a particular country. It is also possi-
ble that this reduction may also increase the government￿ s bargaining power (as
9As both expressions in the product are positive we can apply a monotonic transformation
of the expression into logarithms and easily check that both the FOC as well as the SOC are
satis￿ed.
11McMillan and Waxman argue), rather than just its share in the rents. (This
case is studied later, through the F-contract analysis.)
Substituting the above result back into the pro￿t function and consumer
surplus function gives:











Hence the lower are sunk costs (i.e. the higher is ￿) the higher are pro￿ts
and the lower is consumer surplus. The pro￿t maximising level of investment
for the ￿rm is:




It follows that as R00 < 0, @i
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@f > 0: Total welfare is:










￿R(if) ￿ if (3)
If b > a (i.e. undertrusting) then by inspection of (3), as b is reduced a+b
2b
reaches a maximum (becomes 1) when b = a; whereas a￿b
2a (which is ￿ 0) also
reaches a maximum (it becomes 0). Moreover, from (2) if b > a, then:
if j R0(if)b>a = 2b
af+b￿ > 2b
bf+b￿ = 2
f+￿ = if j R0(if)b=a<1 = if j R0(if)b=a=1
Since R0 = 2b
af+b￿; it is easy to conclude that R0 is an increasing function
of b and a decreasing function of a: As R0 is an inverse function of investment
(since R00 < 0), this means that investment is a decreasing function of b and an





b=a=1; i.e. the above results hold as long as b = a irrespective of whether
absolute trustworthiness levels are high or low. This implies that complete
trustworthiness (b = a = 1) is not required, rather just matching values of b and
a. (In the A&S model, implicitly a = b = 1.)
Conclusion 2 Untrustworthy agents can transact as e¢ ciently as trustworthy
agents provided that they hold similar estimates of the buyer￿ s commitment to
the payment agreement in the contract. What matters is that the buyer is trusted
to the degree that it deserves to be trusted, rather than whether the buyer gov-
ernment is per se a trustworthy contracting party.
Conclusion 2 explains why some countries which are ruled by a tight and
corrupt elite where a and b are both low but matching, can still sustain private
investment in sunk assets through renegotiation with a monopoly supplier (as
12in the case of some sub-Saharan African countries). Note that this model of
matching expectations only works in ￿ exible contracts as it depends on contin-
uous renegotiation, or within a relational contract arrangement.
Another very interesting issue rises from the fact that undertrusting (a <
b) adds a deadweight loss by making the welfare function directly dependent
on ￿ as indicated in (3); the higher ￿ is (the lower sunk costs are) then the
higher this deadweight loss is. Moreover the surplus following renegotiation
is now multiplied by a factor a+b
2b less than one, that measures the degree of
undertrusting.
Hence undertrusting reduces welfare in two ways: (i) through the inability
of the purchasing government to fully reclaim the surplus from sunk investment
lost to the supplying ￿rm and (ii) by a reduction in the amount of surplus
accruing to the society following renegotiation. This translates into the next
two conclusions below.
Conclusion 3 In the presence of undertrusting, the smaller the proportion of
sunk assets (i.e. the higher is ￿) the greater the deadweight loss resulting from
the existence of a given level of undertrusting.
In other words, an implication of undertrusting is that a decrease in the
degree of asset speci￿city (an increase in ￿) will reduce CS by more than it
will increase ￿; while in the Athias and Saussier paper these two e⁄ects exactly
o⁄set each other so that, in their model, there is no direct impact of the sunk
costs parameter on the welfare function - it only a⁄ects investment levels.
In simple terms the purchasing government is hit by a lower asset speci￿city
to a greater extent than the investor bene￿ts from it. Hence, an increase in
asset speci￿city (a reduction in ￿), directly increases welfare by reducing the
importance of this lack of ability by the buyer to fully capture what is lost to
the seller. The reverse situation applies in the case of overtrusting; low sunk
costs increase welfare as the direct e⁄ect is now a positive function of the value
of ￿:
Note that the indirect e⁄ect of sunk costs on welfare is always negative as an
increase in asset speci￿city (a reduction in ￿) depresses investment. Hence, in
the case of overtrusting, the existence of the direct e⁄ect reinforces the impact
of the indirect e⁄ect; while in the case of undertrusting, the former o⁄sets the
latter and ￿nally in the case where a = b the direct e⁄ect is zero.
As already mentioned earlier, in the presence of undertrusting the society￿ s
surplus retention following renegotiation is reduced. This arises because the




, which is smaller than 1 for
a < b, because the ￿rm investing in the country receives a smaller part of the
surplus following renegotiation than it did in the A&S model.
Conclusion 4 The existence of undertrusting reduces the society￿ s ability to
bene￿t from the investment induced surplus by lowering the overall coe¢ cient of
surplus retention.
13Again, the opposite conclusion holds for overtrusting. Note that overtrusting
directly increases welfare in the two ways mentioned above. This means that
contracts where overtrusting is present will lead to big welfare gains in the short
run. However they are likely to end in rapid contract collapse as soon as there is
a realignment of expectations held by the investing companies to more realistic
values (viz. Argentina in the late 1990s).
Theorem 1 When renegotiation costs are su¢ ciently low and asset speci￿city
su¢ ciently high, welfare is a decreasing function of the government￿ s (buyer￿ s)
perception of its trustworthiness and an increasing function of the selling ￿rm￿ s




a > 1: In other words for af > b￿ (b > a), b (a) has
a negative (positive) indirect impact on W; reinforcing the negative (positive)
direct impact of the same parameter on the welfare function.
Proof. Please refer to the appendix.
As was shown earlier, if b > a then Wf is smaller than it would be if b
was reduced to equal a (and vice versa). Hence undertrusting reduces welfare,
just as overtrusting increases welfare (albeit temporarily as mentioned earlier).
Interestingly, market e¢ ciency in terms of increasing welfare using as a starting
position b > a does not require complete trustworthiness, but rather only that
b = a. We now turn out attention to an attempt to tackle the problem of
undertrusting with the use of prepayment contracts.
3.2 Prepayment contracts
In this section we model ￿ exible contracts with prepayments following the
Braynov and Sandholm approach outlined above. In our context prepayments
are used in the wider sense to cover any form of contractual or institutional
arrangement that e⁄ectively guarantees payments to the investor in the form of
NPV contracts, political or regulatory risk guarantees and any other ￿ as good
as in your pocket money￿payment arrangement.
Whether or not a regulatory agency counts as a pre-payment arrangement
is an interesting and di¢ cult question. It seems reasonable to argue that es-
tablished regulators that have been in place for 5-10 years or more, that were
created by a primary law and which operate in a country with a strong rule
of law can be considered as a type of pre-payment arrangement. This would
apply to the UK infrastructure regulators (Ofgem, Ofcom, Ofwat,etc.) as well
as, for French water supply, the Conseil d￿ Etat. It would most obviously apply
to US utilities operating under the protection of the Supreme Court judgment
of the Hope Gas case of 1944. However, even in such circumstances, regulatory
opportunism is not unknown and, unless clearly and rapidly corrected, removes
the implicit pre-payment trust protection.
Conversely, it makes little sense to make the same case for a six month old
regulator created by presidential decree and operating in a country with weak
14rule of law. Indeed, we have a number of examples of cases where companies
have indulged in ￿ over-trusting￿because an infrastructure regulator was in place
but the investing company placed too much reliance on the government allowing
the regulator to operate according to the letter of the law. The classic example of
this is Argentina in the 1990s but several Asian regulators and others were also,
post-1997, found not to provide the anticipated payment protection. Hence, the
development of (temporary) regulatory risk guarantees and other issues to buy
pre-payment protection while the regulatory agency establishes its credentials
as an e⁄ective pre-payment entity.
For ￿ exible contracts with prepayments, the Nash bargaining problem is:
(fR(i) ￿ P0 ￿ bt)(P0 + at ￿ r(i))
which gives a payment solution:
t =
afR(i) + b￿R(i) ￿ (a + b)P0
2ab
(4)










CSP0 = B0 ￿ P0 ￿
afR(i)+b￿R(i)￿(a+b)P0







As both of the above functions are increasing functions of the prepayment




which if replaced into the above functions they become
￿P0 =
afR(i)+b￿R(i)
a+b ￿ C0 ￿ i
CSP0 = B0 +
bfR(i)￿b￿R(i)
a+b
Hence we see that in the case of a prepayment contract the surplus division
between the buyer and the seller is in proportion to each party￿ s trustworthiness
estimate of the buyer after adjusting for the non-sunk element of investment in
favour of the investor. The pro￿t maximising level of investment is:




WP0 = B0 ￿ C0 + fR(i) ￿ iP0 (6)
15Hence welfare in this case is only a⁄ected by the values of the trustworthiness
parameters indirectly through the impact of any changes on these parameters
on the level of investment. Clearly as R0 > 0; R00 < 0 and R00 < 0, then since
for b > a :
R0(iP0) = a+b
af+b￿ < R0(if) = 2b
af+b￿;
it follows that iP0 > if and R(iP0) > R(if):
We next calculate the impact of b on WP0, again through the split of the
total derivative into a direct and an indirect e⁄ect. As the direct e⁄ect on
















which clearly is negative as R00(iP0) < 0: Hence again b has a negative impact


















Conclusion 5 Under prepayment contracts, welfare is a decreasing function
of the buying state￿ s own perception of its trustworthiness, and an increasing
function of the seller￿ s perception of the trustworthiness of the buying state.
However the impact of both is only limited to the indirect e⁄ect of the trust-
worthiness parameters via their impact on the level of investment and neither
a⁄ects the welfare function directly.
Theorem 2 The higher the degree of undertrusting, the more e¢ cient are pre-
payment contracts compared to a ￿exible contracts.
Proof. Please refer to the appendix.
Issues of incentive compatibility may exist in ￿ exible contracts. In partic-
ular, it may be bene￿cial for the buyer to declare an overestimate of his own
trustworthiness given that this will reduce the share of the payment that goes
to the ￿rm. Even with the context of a prepayment contract the buyer may still
have an incentive to overstate his trustworthiness.
Theorem 3 Both the ￿exible payment contracts and the ￿exible prepayment
contracts are not always incentive compatible as buyer governments have an
incentive to exaggerate their trustworthiness to a considerable extent.
Proof. Please refer to the appendix.
Therefore in both types of contracts the buyer has an incentive to overstate
his trustworthiness as long as the adverse impact that an in￿ ated b has on
investment is not so detrimental for it to more than o⁄set any direct gains
accruing to the buyer by overstating his trustworthiness.
163.3 F-contracts10
If we drop the assumption that the buyer will always honestly declare its esti-
mate of its own trustworthiness, then in this case it will be more appropriate to
use an F-prepayment contract of the form:
F = (fR(i) ￿ P0 ￿ bt)a(P0 + at ￿ r(i))b
Such a contract allows the trustworthiness declared by each party a⁄ect the
payo⁄of the other party. This approach coupled up with prepayments makes the
payo⁄s going to both parties independent of the trustworthiness parameters. As
we will show below, the impact of undertrusting on investment and welfare
can be eliminated by establishing an F-contract.
The relevance of this model is not as a real world possible contract but in its
role as a benchmark. As we have seen ￿ exible contracts become more di¢ cult to
agree and sustain as b
a increases, because such contracts are no longer incentive
compatible. The level of e¢ ciency as measured by welfare, achieved by the
benchmark F-contract model is only possible in the pure ￿ exible and ￿ exible
prepayment contracts when a = b.
For F-contracts, the payment solution is determined by maximising F with
respect to t:
t =
fR(i) + ￿R(i) ￿ 2P0
a + b
(7)
￿PF = P0 ￿ C0 + a
fR(i)+￿R(i)￿2P0
a+b ￿ i =
(b￿a)P0+afR(i)+a￿R(i)
a+b ￿ C0 ￿ i
CSPF = B0 ￿ P0 ￿ b
fR(i)+￿R(i)￿2P0
a+b + fR(i) = B0 +
(b￿a)P0+afR(i)￿b￿R(i)
a+b
As both of the above functions are increasing functions of the prepayment
amount, the latter needs to be increased as the level of undertrusting (b > a)
increases. This eliminates the incentive for the state to announce a trustworthi-
ness higher than its true one in order to improve its share of consumer surplus




which is independent of both a and b. If replaced into the pro￿t and consumer
surplus functions these become respectively,
￿PF =
(a+b)(fR(i)+￿R(i))




2 ￿ C0 ￿ i
CSPF = B0 +
(a+b)fR(i)￿(a+b)￿R(i)





The prepayment pro￿t maximising level of investment is:




10A full de￿nition and discussion of this incentive compatible category of contracts can be
found in Braynov and Sandholm.
17WPF = B0 ￿ C0 + fR(iPF) ￿ iPF (9)
We see that the investment decision within an F-contract is identical to
the one in the A&S model, and similarly the payments to the seller and the
buyer are independent of the trustworthiness parameters. The F-contracts fully
avoid the implications of trustworthiness by introducing a system of prepayments
such that both the direct as well as the indirect e⁄ects of such parameters are
eliminated. The key point is that the payments in the A&S model have now
become prepayments in the F-contracts.
Theorem 4 The higher the degree of undertrusting, the more e¢ cient an F-
contract compared to a ￿exible one and to a ￿exible prepayment one.
Proof. Please refer to the appendix.
For undertrusting, an F-contract will lead to a welfare higher than the one
experienced in the other two types of ￿ exible contracts. Obviously, for overtrust-
ing F-contracts will result into lower welfare, but would prevent the collapse of
￿ exible contacts once a and b were realigned by converging into ￿:
3.4 Rigid contracts
We use the terminology found in A&S, adding into the model the trustworthiness
parameters. In the A&S model, rigid contracts are those where the contract
speci￿es the main contract terms (e.g. prices, payments, etc.) in advance of
the investment ￿and for the duration of the contract. In addition, the contract
speci￿es the level of the investments to be made.
Renegotiation is excluded from the theoretical model. However, in practice,
renegotiation cannot be excluded and is common ￿not least to rescue projects
where one or both parties ￿nds emerging outcomes becoming unacceptable.
Hence, the pure model is, to some extent, a hypothetical reference model.
The model incorporates some of this via the introduction of ￿ maladaptation￿
costs, which are de￿ned as the di⁄erence between expected surplus levels and
actual (outcome) surplus levels. The impact of maladaptation costs, f , falls
on investment levels; the way in which this happens is explained directly below.
However, higher than expected maladaptation costs will inevitability increase
the probability to renegotiate a rigid contract. This latter issue is discussed in
the 3.5, while in this section we temporarily assume that such a probability is
equal to zero.
In this model, the payo⁄s are:
￿r = P0 ￿ C0 + afR(i) ￿ i
CSr = B0 ￿ P0 + (1 ￿ fb)R(i)
The value of the maladaptation parameter, f < 1, is an inverse measure of
the potential size of the investor￿ s loss over the distribution of outcomes; e.g.
18actual versus expected tra¢ c ￿ ows for toll roads. This parameter in our model
is multiplied by the investor￿ s expectation a that the buyer will pay him the
surplus agreed in the contract. Correspondingly, the surplus received by the
purchasing government is increased by this investor￿ s loss. This is because the
government is a residual claimant to any surplus over and above that paid the
investor as agreed in the contract - subject to b, the probability (as assessed by
the government) that the contractor will be paid the agreed amount.
The ￿rm will choose an investment level ir such that:




So in this case the level of investment only depends on the trustworthiness
of the buyer as perceived by the seller (a), and not at all by the buyer￿ s own
trustworthiness perception, b.
In this model, total welfare is:
Wr = ￿r + CSr = B0 ￿ C0 +
￿
1 + (a ￿ b)f
￿
R(ir) ￿ ir (11)
As in the case of ￿ exible uncertain contracts, Wr is a decreasing function
of b, and an increasing function of a: For the case of a = b; the maladaptation
costs only in￿ uence welfare indirectly (through their impact on investment). If
b > a (undertrusting) then the direct impact of f is negative and constitutes a
deadweight loss, while in the reverse case of overtrusting its direct impact on
welfare is positive.
As we have seen earlier, in the case of ￿ exible contracts undertrusting made
welfare directly dependent on the level of asset speci￿city, thus reducing welfare
in the case of ￿ exible contracts by adding a deadweight loss (this loss in welfare
is higher the lower the level of asset speci￿city is). Here undertrusting makes the
maladaptation parameter feature explicitly in the welfare function as a direct
deadweight loss. This stems from the buyer￿ s inability to fully capture the part
of the surplus lost to the seller. Again this direct impact of f on welfare moves in
the opposite direction to that of its indirect impact (via the level of investment)
when b > a. Obviously, in the case of overtrusting (b < a) the direct impact of
f on welfare moves in the same direction to that of its indirect impact.
The government￿ s own perception of its trustworthiness only has a direct
e⁄ect on welfare, as investment is not a⁄ected by b. Hence:
dW
r
db = ￿fR(ir) < 0


























In other words, under undertrusting Wr is an increasing function of a, i.e.
an increasing function of the seller￿ s perception of the trustworthiness of the
buying state.
19However unlike the ￿ exible uncertain payment contracts, here the actual size
of the parameter a does matter on investment since if a = b < 1:
ir j R0(ir)b=a<1 = 1











Hence the gap between these two stems from the di⁄erence in the investment
level which leads to R(ir)b=a<1 < R(ir)b=a=1. The di⁄erence between Wr
b=a=1
and Wr
b=a<1 depends on the absolute value of a in the way discussed above.
In summary, for rigid contracts matching estimates of trustworthiness are
still important, but in this case, unlike the ￿ exible contract case, the absolute
level of a is important and needs to be high. Good outcomes on e¢ ciency and
investment require both a to be close to one, as well as aligned values between
b and a.
3.5 Hybrid contracts
We ￿nally analyse the hybrid model, where there is always the probability
that subsequent to investment taking place, rigid contracts will be renegoti-
ated, and/or key terms reset. Following this, the key issues we explore in this
section is the relative e¢ ciency (in terms of welfare) between ￿ exible to hybrid
models in terms of the values key parameters: a) maladaptation costs, b) the
probability of renegotiation of an ex ante rigid contract, c) sunk costs and d)
renegotiation costs.
We follow the terminology of A&S and denote by (1 ￿ ￿) the probability to
see an ex ante rigid contract renegotiated. We calculate the pro￿t function of
the ￿rm:
￿H = ￿￿r + (1 ￿ ￿)￿f =
= ￿
￿
P0 ￿ C0 + afR(i) ￿ i
￿
+ (1 ￿ ￿)
￿

















iH j R0(iH) =
2
￿(2af ￿ a




2￿abf + (1 ￿ ￿)(af + b￿)
(14)
So when ￿ = 1; the results are identical to those of a rigid contract as the
government can credibly commit not to renegotiate the contract, while for ￿ = 0
they coincide with those in the ￿ exible model discussed in the beginning of this
paper. We focus on the hybrid case where 0 < ￿ < 1:
Calculating the di⁄erence between the hybrid and the ￿ exible contracts,
20CSH = ￿CSr + (1 ￿ ￿)CSf = ￿
￿













B0 ￿ P0 +
￿
￿(1 ￿ fb) + (1 ￿ ￿)
f






Hence the welfare outcome in the hybrid contract, WH is,
WH = B0 ￿ C0 +
￿
￿ + ￿f(a ￿ b)
￿
R(iH) + (1 ￿ ￿)￿a￿b
2a R(iH)+
+(1 ￿ ￿)f a+b
2b R(iH) ￿ iH
If we calculate the di⁄erence between the welfare in a hybrid contract and
welfare in a ￿ exible contract we get:









(1 ￿ ￿)R(iH) ￿ R(if)
￿
+
+iH ￿ if (15)
We next calculate the impact on this di⁄erence of all the parameters, namely
f;f;￿ and ￿: We present the direct and indirect e⁄ects (through investment)
of all these parameters in the appendix. The results lead us to the following
conclusions:
Proposition 1 For af > b￿ and ￿ > 0; the lower are maladaptation costs (the
higher is f), the more e¢ cient is the hybrid model relative to the ￿exible one.
But if the negative direct (welfare) e⁄ect comes to dominate the positive indirect
one (on investment), then the ￿exible model is more e¢ cient relative to the
hybrid one.
Proof. Please refer to the appendix.
Notice how the existence of undertrusting gives rise to the requirement that
sunk costs are su¢ ciently high and renegotiation costs su¢ ciently low for af >
b￿ to hold; a condition more demanding than in corresponding proposition in
the A&S paper, where the necessary condition was that f > ￿. Our analysis
in the appendix shows that the assumption af > b￿ implies that the impact of









Speci￿cally, the gap between f and ￿ needs to be su¢ ciently high so that
when the former is multiplied by a lower number (a) and the latter by a higher
number (b) the inequality does not change its direction. The more pronounced
undertrusting becomes (the higher the gap between b and a is), the higher the
di⁄erence between f and ￿ needs to be for the proposition to hold.
In other words, the higher the level of undertrusting, the less likely is the
hybrid contract to be more e¢ cient. This is because an increase in the gap
21between b and a will make the inequality af > b￿ increasingly more di¢ cult to
sustain. If it becomes unsustainable and af < b￿; then the positive impact of f
on welfare will be far smaller and, possibly, even negative.
A&S concluded that low maladaptation costs make a hybrid rigid contract
preferable to a ￿ exible contract in terms of welfare. While our proposition (1)
supports this result, it also establishes (for a < b) the existence of a negative
direct e⁄ect of the maladaptation parameter f on welfare (deadweight loss).
This means that for su¢ ciently large di⁄erences between the two trustworthiness
parameters, the results found in this proposition may be reversed. This happens
when this direct (deadweight loss) e⁄ect more than o⁄sets the indirect impact
of f on welfare. Hence substantial undertrusting may turn the tables in favour
of the ￿ exible contract!
The next three propositions are all formally set out, proved and analysed
in the appendix. Here we only summarise these and compare them to the
corresponding propositions 2-4 in A&S. Proposition 2 argues that the lower
the probability to renegotiate is, the more e¢ cient a hybrid contract compared
to a ￿ exible one. On the other hand, the lower the asset speci￿city the more
e¢ cient a ￿ exible contract compared to a hybrid one according to proposition
3. Finally, proposition 4 sets that the lower the renegotiation costs, the more
e¢ cient a ￿ exible model is compared to a hybrid one.
As stated all these propositions are similar to those found in A&S. The com-
mon cause behind any di⁄erences between all of the above four propositions to
propositions (1)-(4) found in A&S is the existence of undertrusting: this results
to the creation of a direct e⁄ect of the parameters on welfare. In simpler terms,
a major implication of our paper is that undertrusting not only reduces the
level of infrastructure investment undertaken by ￿rms; it also leads to a failure
from the side of the buyer to fully capture those parts of the (now reduced)
investment-induced surplus that the investor fails to appropriate because of as-
set speci￿city (in the ￿ exible model), or because of maladaptation (in the rigid
model). Each of these e⁄ects results in a deadweight loss with a direct adverse
impact on welfare. Moreover, in the ￿ exible model undertrusting further reduces
the surplus that goes to the seller (and therefore to the society) as a result of
renegotiation costs.
As a result, in proposition 2, undertrusting lessens the positive impact of ￿
on the welfare superiority of the hybrid contract. The direct e⁄ect of ￿ may be
negative; if this is the case it will reduce or even dominate the positive indirect
e⁄ect of ￿ on welfare. So extensive undertrusting reduces the strength of this
proposition and may even come to reverse it. Proposition (3) is also a⁄ected by
the direct reverse e⁄ect of a higher ￿ on the superiority of the ￿ exible contract
relative to the rigid one unless we restrict (by assuming a su¢ ciently low ￿) this
negative direct e⁄ect to be smaller in absolute terms for the ￿ exible contract
rather than the hybrid contract. This means that the direct e⁄ect reinforces the
welfare superiority of the ￿ exible contract as established in terms of the indirect
e⁄ect. Finally, proposition (4) is not a⁄ected as f already has a direct e⁄ect
on welfare even when a = b = 1. Provided that ￿ is su¢ ciently high for the
positive direct e⁄ect of f on welfare to be larger under a ￿ exible rather than
22hybrid contract, the direct e⁄ect will reinforce the indirect e⁄ect in supporting
the argument that the welfare superiority of the ￿ exible model will increase as
f increases.
4 DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE
MODEL
In the literature to date, there is no distinction between trust levels between
investors and (buyer) governments and the subjective perceptions of the govern-
ment by the investor (and vice-versa). Indeed, the implicit assumption is that
there is no misalignment. However, this may be an unfortunate simpli￿cation.
The reality is not only that contracts are most likely to break down when
there is such misalignment, but also that as we have shown it is unlikely to
achieve incentive compatible contracts unless perceptions can be aligned. That,
in turn, may help explain whether infrastructure contracts that run into di¢ cul-
ties can be renegotiated between the parties. Our conjecture is that in circum-
stances where the seller￿ s perception of the reliability of the buyer is much lower
than the buyer￿ s own perception (undertrusting), the contract is most likely
to break down irrevocably. For contracts where the seller￿ s perception of the
buyer reliability is higher than justi￿ed (overtrusting), contracts may continue
satisfactorily until the misalignment is revealed at which point they are likely
to fall apart rapidly. Conversely, contracts can survive where the levels of trust
are low but perceptions are correctly aligned.
Most of the discussion on trust and most of the theoretical models in this
￿eld accept that a and b can be high or low depending on the country or project
but, implicitly or explicitly assume that a = b. However, there are circumstances
where a and b are both low (e.g. under 0.5) but both parties have the same
perspective and hence private investment in infrastructure may be sustainable.
Conversely, there may be circumstances where a and b are both relatively high
(e.g. above 0.5) but a is su¢ ciently less than b so as to create a signi￿cant
degree of mistrust.
These issues were fully explored in the theoretical model set out in the
previous sections. We can summarise these by setting out a simple typology,
based on a 4 quadrant table as in Table 1 below; we then set out and discuss
some illustrative examples on each case as set in Table 1. The table and the




Case (A) Case (C)
Repeat project and/or contract New type of project or contract
Country with strong institutions Country with strong institutions
and high trustworthiness reputation and high trustworthiness reputation
a = b; a;b ￿! 1 (large) a < b; a;b & 0:5 (moderate)
Case (B) Case (D)
Repeat project and/or contract New type of project or contract
Country with weak and/or Country with past history of weak
corrupt institutions and/or corrupt institutions but trying to
establish reputation for trustworthiness
a = b; a;b ￿! 0 a < b; a;b < 0:5 (small)
The key point behind the table is that mistrust is most likely in circum-
stances of high uncertainty. When is project/contract uncertainty likely to be
highest?
The answer is:
(i) for new types of project, particularly with high construction, technological
or political risk; and
(ii) for countries where they are trying to change from having a low trust-
worthiness reputation to having a high trustworthiness reputation.
In both these cases, a is likely to be signi￿cantly lower than b. Conversely,
for repeat projects based on a history of reasonable success it is likely that a = b,
whether at a high or a low level.
Let us brie￿ y consider each quadrant in turn.
Case (A) represents well-established types of project in high reputation coun-
tries. For many types of infrastructure concession contract or PPP, trust is
likely to be high and the contracting parties may well be able to monitor, en-
force and revise their contracts straightforwardly, without a need for external
assistance (other than occasionally for arbitration/dispute resolution or similar)
or for ￿ pre-payment￿arrangements. Hence, private investment is readily forth-
coming and at a reasonable cost of capital as perceived risk is low. Examples
include repeat water supply management contracts in easy to access and process
water (as in Menard and Saussier), repeat UK PPP contracts in politically un-
contentious sectors, electricity distribution in Chile. This is a sustainable and
e¢ cient process that is potentially welfare maximising.
Case (B) represents infrastructure contracts in countries with low quality in-
stitutions. Supplying companies can and do have supply contracts with govern-
ments in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere where government
is arbitrary and/or corrupt ￿and liable to change on the replacement of the
current autocrat. These contracts can support investment.
The key point is that they are relational contracts where the monitoring,
enforcement and revision is done between the two parties who know one another
24well. The contracts will only be sustainable if the supplier can expect to receive
a return adjusted for higher risks and for any (potentially large) corruption
payments ￿both buyer and seller may receive returns from corrupt practices.
Clearly, these contracts are far from optimal for the consumers or taxpayers
in the countries concerned and are likely to be monopoly contracts that do not
allow any competitive entry (e.g. no independent power producers or competing
telecom operators). But, given aligned beliefs on each party￿ s trustworthiness
of the regime over the life of the contract, they do allow a low-level, incentive
compatible equilibrium with positive private investment and without the need
for a ￿ pre-payment￿arrangement. This process is sustainable (at least while
the current parties continue) but it is highly ine¢ cient and far from welfare
maximizing.
Case (C) represents early and potentially di¢ cult contracts in high reputa-
tion countries. In the UK, the London Underground PPPs were in this cate-
gory (and one ￿the Tube Line PPP - appears to be progressing well, even if the
Metronet PPP has failed) as were the NATS air tra¢ c control contract and early
PPPs in hospitals and prisons. In these cases, to sustain the contract, it helps
to have an external regulator ￿the PPP Arbiter for the London Underground,
the Civil Aviation Authority for NATS.
Note that in most of these cases, there has been an explicit or implicit govern-
ment guarantee providing a ￿ pre-payment￿facility. There clearly are potential
incentive compatibility problems so that breakdown is likely in the case of major
disputes. But, provided the ￿rst contract (or ￿rst few years of the contract) go
well and any major problems are addressed by successful renegotiation (as with
NATS), subsequent contracts or periods should go well. This is because experi-
ence under the contract has realigned initial trust concerns so that a becomes
equal to or close to b.
Most of these contracts faced not only signi￿cant political risk, but most
also had serious construction, technology, demand and/or demand risks. The
London Underground contracts also had major issues of ongoing rather than
front-loaded investment. Interestingly, an early major success for UK PPPs was
the Dartford bridge crossing of the River Thames. For that project, an e⁄ective
and robust ￿ pre-payment￿mechanism was put in place through allowing the
duration of the concession to correspond to that necessary for the contractor to
recover his principal and earn an agreed rate of return (i.e. an NPV contract).
Finally, Case (D) represents countries that start with poor reputations but
are trying hard to obtain private investment into infrastructure e.g. into roads,
power generation, sometimes water. To attract that investment, governments
may pass concession laws, introduce independent regulators or allow external
arbitration or similar. Examples of such countries include Uganda, Nigeria,
Mozambique and Romania.
However, supplying companies are likely to want a demonstrable record of
achievement for those institutions before reducing their cost of capital risk pre-
mia. Hence, the private investment may not be possible ￿at least not at a cost
that would be acceptable in terms of the ￿nal tari⁄. In these circumstances,
private investment will only be forthcoming and sustainable if there is external
25support in place e.g. from an e⁄ective ￿ pre-payment￿agreement. That is where
transitional regulatory risk guarantees and other forms of external underpinning
(e.g. on-demand guarantees, bilateral investment treaties, comprehensive credit
insurance, etc.) can help align perceptions or relative trustworthiness.
If this process is successful and the country ￿ oats away from the (hope-
fully unused) pre-payment support, the result is an e¢ cient equilibrium with
realigned trust perceptions.
The table omits overtrusting. The latter raises more di¢ cult issues and
seems to be much more di¢ cult to anticipate. The non-alignment of trust
perceptions is only revealed after some time. Typically it is not only some period
after pre-agreed investments have been made, but later when unanticipated
problems have arisen which require an increase in the revenue requirement if
the supplying entity under the contract is not to be forced into bankruptcy.
Sometimes, as in the Argentinian case, the misperception is on the powers of
any regulatory agency, particularly at times of crisis.
Note that sometimes trust perception problems clearly exist, but it is un-
clear whether we are observing undertrusting or overtrusting. The collapse
of the London Underground Metronet PPPs initially looks like an example of
undertrusting ￿and certainly some of the features of the contract re￿ ect un-
dertrusting via the political risks from the hostility of the London authorities
to a PPP model. However, it is also possible to argue that the failure is a case
of overtrusting where the investor believed that the contract was closer to a
cost-plus contract than was actually the case. This example points to the need,
in future work, to extend the model to encompass perceptions of sellers as well
as of buyers.
5 CONCLUSIONS
The key conclusions of this paper are:
(i) How far governments and investors share the same perceptions of gov-
ernment trustworthiness in contract enforcement is at least as important for the
sustainability of infrastructure contracts and investment as whether absolute
levels of trust are high or low.
(ii) Undertrusting (i.e. where the company has a lower perception of govern-
ment trustworthiness than the government has) is the more frequently observed
case. This occurs when investing infrastructure ￿rms have a lower expectation
of full payment under the contract than the government has ex ante e.g. at the
time of initially negotiating the contract.
(iii) The negative e⁄ects of undertrusting increase the higher the proportion
of assets that are sunk and the higher the degree of trust misalignment.
(iv) In our model, undertrusting leads to direct negative e⁄ects on total
welfare as well as indirect negative e⁄ects on welfare via the level of investment.
This is in contrast to the Athias and Saussier model where, in the absence of
trust misalignment, only indirect e⁄ects occur via the level of investment. In our
model, the direct e⁄ects are deadweight losses inversely related to the degree of
26asset speci￿city and the degree of maladaptation costs and directly related to
the degree of trust misalignment.
(v) Undertrusting is a transitional state of imbalance, primarily associated
with innovative contracts or ￿rst-time contracting parties. To rectify it, requires
the use of external measures such as pre-payment arrangements, regulatory
and/or other guarantees, or other speci￿c actions to realign initially di⁄erent
perceptions.
(vi) Overtrusting is theoretically less likely and is also less frequently ob-
served in practice. It is not easy to rectify, and when revealed is likely to lead
to rapid contract breakdown. The revelation is likely to arise when the buyer
approaches the seller for a post-investment revenue increase relative to what
was expected and/or speci￿ed in the original contract .
(vii) Rigid contracts appear particularly unattractive in our model as they
are dependent for sustainability not only on closely aligned trust perceptions,
but also on high absolute levels of trust, whereas ￿ exible relational infrastructure
concession contracts are potentially sustainable with low but aligned levels of
trust, typically on a relational basis.
(viii) Under conditions of undertrusting, ￿ exible contracts are not incentive
compatible so that successful renegotiation in situations of serious problems is
likely to be very di¢ cult.
(ix) Hybrid contracts tend to be more e¢ cient than either pure rigid or
￿ exible contracts except at higher levels of undertrusting when ￿ exible contracts
dominate ￿assuming they are sustainable.
(x) The potential for trust misalignments e.g. over future investment require-
ments and costs, technology uncertainties, political sensitivities, etc. provides
additional support for the role of external regulatory or similar agencies, guar-
antees and similar mechanisms. These also support the use of hybrid contracts
(rigid contracts but with a strictly positive probability of renegotiation.)
The work reported here is, as far as we are aware, a ￿rst attempt to seriously
model the role of potential trust misalignments on welfare and investment in
infrastructure contracts. Such an analysis helps bring out the potential role of
regulatory agencies, of external guarantee mechanisms and of contract features
that reduce uncertainty (e.g. NPV contracts). We see this as a useful exten-
sion to the Athias and Saussier model which has been very clearly set out and
empirically tested for toll road concessions.
We look forward to seeing whether our proposed framework and approach
can be usefully extended. More importantly, we would like to be able to test
its predictions using real world data on infrastructure contracts in developing
as well as in OECD countries.
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287 APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1
We ￿rst show that Wf is a decreasing function of b. To calculate the impact
of b on Wf we split this into a direct and an indirect e⁄ect; the latter evaluates



















































If b > a (undertrusting) and
f
￿ > b























R00(if) < 0. Therefore, b has a negative indirect
impact on W; reinforcing the negative direct impact.






































2 < 0; this implies a positive impact of a on the level












Proof of Theorem 2


























































































negative. Hence as undertrusting increases because a decreases and/or b de-
creases, a prepayment contract becomes more e¢ cient in relation to a ￿ exible
contract.
Proof of Theorem 3
Let us assume a falsely declared beta (say bdl) higher that the true beta (say
















CSf = B0 ￿ P0 + fR(i) ￿ btrt ,
dCS
f





@bdl ￿ btr dt
dbdl ,
dCSf








As f > ￿ and 1 > bdl > btr, the term in the brackets is positive and hence the
overall indirect e⁄ect is negative. Hence the buyer has an incentive to overstate
his trustworthiness as long as the impact of an in￿ ated b on investment is not so
detrimental as to substantially reduce both i and hence R (which are determined
by the ￿rm given its pro￿t maximising investment decision) to such an extent
that more than o⁄sets any direct gains for the buyer.



































11This is rather unlikely: clearly
f
2￿￿2
2f￿ is an increasing function of f and a decreasing
function of ￿; hence unless the former is small and the latter large this inequality is unlikely
to hold. We already know that
f
￿ > b





rather than the other way round.
30Hence as
CSP0 = B0 ￿ P0 + fR(i) ￿ 0btr ,
dCS
P0















Hence again the buyer has an incentive to overstate his trustworthiness pro-
vided that the impact of an in￿ ated b on investment is not so detrimental that
the reduction in investment as denoted by the second term in the relation above





dbdl does not depend on the magnitude of the true
value of b; bdl:
Proof of Theorem 4
Comparing the PF solution (prepayment F-contracts) to those of pure ￿ ex-
ibility contracts f and the prepayment ones we get that for b > a
R0(iPF) = 2
f+￿ 6 R0(if) = 2b
af+b￿
it follows that iPF > iP0 > if and R(iPF) > R(iP0) > R(if):
As @W
PF



















@b = 0, both the direct as well as the indirect e⁄ects
of b on welfare are zero. Hence taking the di⁄erence between WPF ￿ Wf and












Hence the higher b is, the more e¢ cient if the F- prepayment contract is as
compared to the pure ￿ exible contract of A&S.
Similarly both the direct as well as the indirect e⁄ect of a on WPF is zero,
and hence the lower a is, the more e¢ cient an F- prepayment contract as com-
pared to a ￿ exible contract.
In an analogous manner, we compare the welfare implications of an F-
contract to that of a prepayment contract. Calculating:
WPF ￿ WP0 = fR(iPF) ￿ iPF ￿ fR(iP0) + iP0
























Hence the higher b is, the more e¢ cient the F-prepayment contract as









Next, we set out in detail the proofs for the four propositions referred to in
section 3.5.
For ￿ > 0; iH > if, R(iH) > R(if) we require that R0(iH) < R0(if), which
holds if:
(2bf ￿ f)a > b￿ (19)





We now look at the impact of parameters on investment. First we look at
























0 < R00(if) > R00(iH) , ￿ 1



















































































0 < R00(if) > R00(iH) , ￿ 1

















































0 > R00(if) > R00(iH) , ￿ 1










































To derive the indirect impact of the above parameters on welfare, we ￿rst





When calculating the indirect e⁄ect on welfare in the ￿ exible and hybrid






2￿a(1 ￿ fb) + (1 ￿ ￿)(af ￿ b￿)
￿









For the above to hold, it su¢ ces to show that:
￿
2￿a(1 ￿ fb) + (1 ￿ ￿)(af ￿ b￿)
￿
(af + b￿) < ￿￿
2￿abf + (1 ￿ ￿)(af + b￿)
￿￿
(af ￿ b￿) ,
2￿a(1 ￿ fb)(af + b￿) < 2￿abf(af ￿ b￿) ,
(af + b￿) < bf(af ￿ b￿) + fb(af + b￿) ,
(1 ￿ bf)(af + b￿) ￿ bf(af ￿ b￿) < 0 ,
b￿ < af(2bf ￿ 1) (27)
As clearly,
af(2bf ￿ 1) < a(2bf ￿ f);
34this means that inequality (27) implies inequality (19). Remember that what
has been assumed so far is that af > b￿: (27) can be true provided that 2bf ￿1
is positive and su¢ ciently close to one for the direction of the inequality to
be retained. In other words we require that the maladaptation costs in the
hybrid model are small. This is more restrictive than the existing boundary
on maladaptation costs compared to renegotiation costs which requires that
relation (19) is satis￿ed i.e., (2bf ￿ f)a > b￿; this in turn is more restrictive
that the one in A&S which required that (2f ￿ f) > ￿ , f > since a > b:
As we will see below, the above indicates that the presence of undertrusting
requires that maladaptation costs need to be further bounded relative to rene-
gotiation costs (e.g. f >
af+b￿
2abf rather than just f >
f+￿
2 ) for propositions 3
and 4 regarding the relative e¢ ciency of ￿ exible to hybrid contracts in relation
to changes in asset speci￿city and renegotiation costs to hold.
Proof of Proposition 1
Obviously both the direct as well as the indirect e⁄ect of f on welfare under















Moreover as the direct e⁄ect of f on WH is equal to ￿(a￿b)R(iH) < 0 this means
that the e¢ ciency of the hybrid model relative to the ￿ exible one is eroded by
the existence of a deadweight loss in the case of undertrusting. If the negative
direct e⁄ect on WH is dominated by the positive indirect e⁄ect on WH; then
the higher f (i.e. the lower the misalignment cost is), the more e¢ cient the
hybrid contract compared to a ￿ exible one. On the other hand, if the direct
e⁄ect dominates the indirect e⁄ect the reverse will be the case. However the
latter is unlikely to happen for as long as
f
￿ > b
a > 1 as the gap in the value of
b and a will be exceeded by the gap in the values of f and ￿:
For the next proposition, we shall add to the assumption af > b￿; the






Proposition 2 For af > b￿; 2ab
(b￿a) >
￿
(2bf ￿ f)a ￿ b￿
￿
> 0 and ￿ > 0, the
lower the probability to renegotiate a rigid contract (the higher ￿); the more
e¢ cient a hybrid contract compared to a ￿exible one. This relies on su¢ ciently





i.e. a more restrictive lower boundary for f than in the A&S model, where
a = b = 1):
















Moreover in the hybrid contract there is a direct e⁄ect of the same parameter
equal to:
[1 + f(a ￿ b)]R(iH) ￿ ￿a￿b




4ab [2ab ￿ 2abf(a ￿ b) ￿ b(a ￿ b)￿ ￿ a(a + b)f]
For the direct e⁄ect to reinforce the indirect one, the former should be pos-








In Proposition (2), if a = b = 1, the direct e⁄ect of ￿ on welfare in the hybrid
model becomes equal to 1 ￿ f which clearly is positive. However for a < b we
do need a more complex condition to ensure that this is the case, so that the
indirect positive e⁄ect of ￿ on welfare in the hybrid model is supported by the
direct e⁄ect. This complex condition requires that both the gap in the values
of the trustworthiness parameters as well as the size of the maladaptation costs
are su¢ ciently small to ensure that this is the case.
For the remaining two propositions, we shall start from the requirement
that the impact of investment on welfare in a hybrid contract is smaller that





already shown, this requires inequality (27), which is re-written below, to hold:
af(2bf ￿ 1) > b￿
Inequality (27) is a su¢ cient condition for the following three in-
equalities to hold:
1. af > b￿;
2. [(2bf ￿ f)a] > b￿













Assumption 1 is shared by all propositions, while assumption 2 is shared by
the last three propositions. Assumption 3 imposes further size boundaries for
f; f and ￿. In particular, the lower boundary for the value of f; which is an
inverse measure of the misalignment costs, becomes even more restrictive than
in Proposition 2. More simply, the maladaptation costs are smaller (i.e. f is
higher) than the level needed to ensure that as the probability of renegotiation
decreases, the hybrid contract becomes more e¢ cient relative to the ￿ exible one.
If (27) holds, then the impact of the size of renegotiation and sunk costs on
the e¢ ciency (in welfare terms) of the ￿ exible contract relative to the hybrid
contract is determined by the following two propositions:








R(iH) ; the lower
the level of asset speci￿city (i.e. the higher ￿), the more e¢ cient the ￿exible
contract compared to the hybrid one.
















if (27) is satis￿ed which means that (26) holds. As already discussed the
direct e⁄ect of ￿ on welfare is negative in both models given the introduction
of a deadweight loss if a < b: Hence for this negative impact to be of a smaller
absolute size for the ￿ exible compared to the hybrid one, so that the above
inequality is preserved, the condition is that





The upper boundary set for ￿ re￿ ects the requirement that the direct e⁄ect
(deadweight loss) of ￿ on welfare is (in absolute terms) smaller in the ￿ exible





d￿ < 0; and therefore proposition 3 applies.








R(iH) ; the lower the
renegotiation costs (i.e. the higher f); the more e¢ cient a ￿exible contract
compared to a hybrid one.
















if (27) is satis￿ed which means that (26) holds. Therefore there is a larger
indirect e⁄ect for the ￿ exible as compared to the hybrid model. This will be









@f . In other words, the lower boundary for ￿ re￿ ects the
requirement that the direct positive e⁄ect of f on welfare is greater in the
￿ exible contract than in hybrid rigid one. Given this boundary, proposition 4 of
the A&S paper, that the lower the renegotiation costs (the higher f), the more





is reinforced under conditions of undertrusting.
The actual size of the commitment not to renegotiate matters in both propo-
sitions (3) and (4). This is once more the result of the existence of the direct
e⁄ect that both parameters ￿ and f have on welfare, but in an opposite man-
ner. As far as proposition (4) is concerned, the higher ￿ is (the higher the
commitment not to renegotiate) the more similar the hybrid model becomes
to the pure rigid one. All other things being equal, the higher f is (the lower
renegotiation costs are), the more advantageous the ￿ exible contract is. This
result is the same as the A&S proposition (4). On the other hand, the lower ￿
is (the higher the probability to renegotiate), then the hybrid model becomes
37increasingly similar to the ￿ exible one. Hence the latter contract loses some
of its advantage in terms of low renegotiation costs, but gains an advantage in
terms of low asset speci￿city terms, as it further strengthens the argument that
a ￿ exible contract is to be preferred if sunk costs are low, as proposition (3)
indicates.
38